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Abstract 
 
This article examines how national health actors in South Africa, Tanzania and 
Zambia perceive the participatory quality of negotiation processes associated with the 
performance-based funding mechanisms of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria and the World Bank. Through analysis of qualitative 
fieldwork consisting of 101 interviews within the case countries as well as in Geneva 
and Washington DC, the research results show that African actors within national 
governments generally set and negotiate performance targets of performance-based 
funding schemes. Nevertheless, the results also show that the quality of those 
negotiations with external funders were inconsistent, suggesting the existence of 
asymmetrical power and influence in relation to the quality of those negotiations. This 
raises questions about the level of power and influence being exerted by external 
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funders and how much negotiation leverage African political actors have available to 
them within global health diplomacy. It also provides evidence that certain key 
aspects of these negotiated processes are closed off from negotiation for African 
actors and therefore undermine African participation in significant ways.  
 
Introduction 
 
The term global health diplomacy (GHD) has become increasingly entrenched within 
the global health governance lexicon (Kickbusch & Kokeny, 2013). An  increasing 
number of official GHD strategies are being established within developed countries 
such as Japan (Abe, 2013), France, Norway (OMD, 2007) and the United States 
(Jaffe, 2013); and in developing countries such as Indonesia (Seiff, 2013), South 
Africa, Senegal, Thailand (OMD, 2007); as well as in regional organizations such as 
the Eastern, Central and Southern Africa Health Community (ECSA-HC, 2014). 
Although GHD has recently received a level of ideational popularity, the concept of 
health diplomacy itself remains underdeveloped.  
 
The definition of GHD remains varied with understandings ranging from “an 
emerging field that addresses the dual goals of improving global health and better 
international relations” (Adams, 2008), to “processes by which governments, 
multilateral and civil society actors attempt to position health in foreign policy 
negotiations and to create new forms of global health governance” (Labonte & 
Gagnon, 2010), to “multi-level negotiation processes that shape and manage the 
global health policy environment for health” (Kickbusch et al., 2007; WHO, 2014). A 
more encompassing definition suggests that GHD is “the policy-shaping processes 
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through which states, intergovernmental organizations, and non-state actors negotiate 
responses to health challenges or utilize health concepts or mechanisms in policy-
shaping and negotiation strategies to achieve foreign policy goals and the utilization 
of foreign policy to achieve health goals” (GHD.NET, 2009). Although ‘negotiation 
processes’ are highlighted as key to GHD, there remains limited research attempting 
to link directly descriptive accounts of diplomatic exchange to better theoretical and 
conceptual explanations about the ways global health policy is negotiated (Blouin et 
al., 2012; Michaud & Kates, 2013). In this regard, GHD denotes processes of 
negotiation that take place multilaterally and bilaterally between countries, 
multisectorally between states, non-state and international organizations, and non-
officially between stakeholders and representatives (Katz et al., 2011). What is not 
always clear, however, is the quality of these negotiations and what it says about 
global health diplomacy more broadly. 
 
Despite on-going debates about the exact specificity of GHD, it is possible to locate 
two common properties associated with GHD, which are deemed essential to its core 
conceptual understanding. Literature surveys show agreement on the need to better 
map the formal spaces for diplomatic participation (Katz et al., 2011) and the need to 
pinpoint the practiced processes of negotiation operating between health policymakers 
(Kickbusch et al., 2013). In other words, whatever GHD is, its conceptualization 
involves understanding the specified spaces for diplomacy and the negotiation 
practices that enable diplomatic agreement on health policy. By better understanding 
these operating conditions, it is then possible to pinpoint key substantive qualities 
inherent to these diplomacy processes and determine how these qualities correspond 
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to other explanatory or normative considerations of global health governance more 
broadly (Berridge, 2005; Kickbusch et al., 2013). 
 
The purpose of this article is to investigate how national health actors in South Africa, 
Tanzania and Zambia negotiate the performance-based funding (PBF) mechanisms 
associated with the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) 
and World Bank. As will be outlined below, by negotiation we mean the “process of 
exchange between two or more interested parties for the purpose of reaching an 
agreement that can satisfy various interests of mutual concern” (Fisher et al., 1997). 
By using PBF as a lens to examine how actors engage in global health policy, and by 
focusing on specific country contexts, it is possible to better isolate key negotiation 
processes available to African actors as an aspect of global health diplomacy. PBF is 
important as a thematic case study because it has emerged as an increasingly 
omnipotent policy phenomenon in the governance of health (Ireland et al., 2011), 
which resonates with GHD definitions that emphasize health negotiations and the 
need to better understand the spaces and practices involved (PBF involves multilevel 
negotiations among policymakers at local, national, regional and global levels). 
Investigating the dynamics involved in PBF negotiations makes it possible to discern 
unique properties specific to the quality of negotiated agreement as, for example, in 
terms of equitable diplomatic positioning as perceived by the negotiating agents 
themselves.  
 
In global health, PBF refers to the idea of transferring resources from funders (money, 
material goods) on condition that particular actions are taken and that recipients 
achieve specific, predefined performance targets (Eldridge & Palmer, 2009). With 
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reference to the Paris Declaration (PDAE, 2005), funding agencies such as the World 
Bank and GFATM argue that PBF will promote reform in a way that is ‘nationally 
owned’ and accountable (Witter et al., 2012), because performance indicators are 
designed by, and negotiated with, national coordinating bodies that have set these 
targets for themselves. Nevertheless, there is no systematic research examining the 
quality of these negotiations and how final agreements represent African interests in 
overall health diplomacy. As will be presented below, due to the nature of World 
Bank and GFATM PBF mechanisms, most negotiations take place bilaterally between 
the funder and the national government/principal recipients. This often does not 
involve regional actors and tends to exclude and/or undervalue many local 
stakeholders (although this varies from case to case and is determined by how 
stakeholders are included in national decision-making processes) (Barnes et al., 
2015). Because most negotiations about the final complexion of PBF are bilateral 
(although various NGOs can act as brokers), this article focuses on processes of 
negotiating PBF mechanisms between external funders and national/principal 
recipients, leaving aside discussion of internal negotiating mechanisms within state 
bodies/CCMs or how INGOs/NGOs influence these processes.  
 
Through this examination it is possible to conclude that although some phases of the 
negotiation process display conditions of equitable consonance between stakeholders 
in terms of recognized health priorities and the importance of cooperative health 
initiatives, the negotiations themselves often operate within frameworks that limit 
African negotiations in profound ways. As a result, if the substantive quality of global 
health diplomacy is to be judged on the perceived quality of mutually consistent 
negotiations and outcomes (Drager et al., 2000; Raiffa, 2007), then the evidence 
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suggests that current practice of PBF modalities is often in tension with more 
idealized GHD understandings of mutually consistent negotiation. It is possible, 
therefore, to locate asymmetrical influence and power that negatively affect 
diplomatic relations as they concern global health financing. 
 
Methodology 
 
The empirical material underpinning this article is from fieldwork conducted as part 
of a broader research programme of the Regional Network for Equity in Health in east 
and southern Africa (EQUINET) supported by the IDRC (Canada) on global health 
diplomacy in east and southern Africa. The research took place between October 2012 
and June 2013, in which 101 people participated in semi-structured interviews in 
Geneva, South Africa, Tanzania, Washington DC, and Zambia (Barnes et al., 2014). 
South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia were selected as cases because they exhibit 
essential variables for comparison, including: 1) recent or ongoing PBF projects 
associated with the World Bank and GFATM; 2) ongoing PBF negotiations with the 
World Bank and GFATM; and 3) had diplomatic missions in Geneva engaged in 
negotiations on global health policy. In terms of differences deemed useful for cross-
country comparison: 1) the percentage of overall health budget for each of the case 
studies was significantly different in terms of national reliance on external funding, 
allowing comparison in terms of how budgetary dependence allowed for better or 
worse negotiating position; and 2) each case country had stated different forms of 
‘success’ in ongoing negotiations with the World Bank and Global Fund. In all cases, 
the self-definition of success in terms of negotiated outcome suggested mixed 
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perceptions of quality that provided illuminating insights on African diplomacy in 
terms of PBF programmes and the policy aims of GHD more broadly. 
 
To capture individual African actors’ understanding of negotiated PBF, a mixed 
qualitative methodology was employed to ensure that the theoretical, historical and 
empirical aspects of the research were fully met. Secondary sources drew on existing 
academic literature and policy documents on PBF and participation in global health 
and international development (Barnes et al., 2014). Primary research was based on 
policy analysis, semi-structured interviews, participant observation and stakeholder 
analysis. The interviews followed a thematic guide that included: 1) association with 
PBF and professional background; 2) understanding of PBF; 3) knowledge of 
decision-making and negotiation processes; 4) influence on process; and 5) contextual 
aspects of strategic planning, input and outcomes of PBF. The sample size of 101 
participants was deemed suitable to generate significant results because: 1) 
stakeholder analysis located the main actors involved in PBF negotiation at the outset 
and ongoing stakeholder analysis was allowed as processes of snowballing revealed 
new stakeholders during interviews; 2) there was variation in the elite stakeholders 
interviewed, with different sectors represented (government, civil society, private 
sector, external funders); 3) the data became saturated (repetition of data across 
interviewees); and 4) qualitative interviewing and analysis is well suited to capture 
subjective/intersubjective understandings as they relate to PBF and processes of 
negotiation. This is because qualitative semi-structured interview techniques allow for 
greater investigation for why a particular view is held by an interviewee as well as to 
allow follow-up questions to uncover the underlying rationale for why such a view 
was held. 
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During the analysis phase, main concepts and themes were identified through 
familiarization with the interview material. Familiarization took place during 
interviews and by thoroughly reading through the transcripts. Thus, there was no 
clear-cut border between the interview phase and the analysis phase. The floating 
character of this analysis allowed the project to better understand the subject of 
inquiry, which related to perceptions of participation in PBF and the perceived quality 
of that participation. Further analysis of the research data progressed in an iterative 
way using thematic analysis (sorting, labeling, summarizing data using predefined 
concepts such as understanding, assumptions, rationales and meanings), while also 
identifying new, emergent themes, detecting patterns and developing explanations to 
answer research questions. The analysis below represents key categorizations. 
 
Analytical Framework 
 
The original EQUINET Discussion Paper (Barnes et al., 2014) analyzed the data via 
the thematic analysis described above. In this article, we have extended analysis by 
employing Zartman and Berman’s (1982) negotiated agreement model as an 
analytical framework to catalogue and analyze the empirical material. This framework 
was selected because of its wider recognition as an instrument that can help locate and 
classify key negotiation spaces, phases, and internal modes of operation (Lewicki et 
al., 2009). Zartman and Berman (1982) distinguish three phases of negotiation 
between interested parties to reach agreement. First, negotiations generally display a 
diagnostic phase where key problems, issues and goals of mutual concern are 
identified, presented and prepared for deliberation. Second, negotiations also contain 
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a formula phase, where a shared, normative and deliberative framework is specified 
and delineated. Third, all negotiations go through a detailed phase of deliberation, 
contestation, debate and exchange, where the specific terms of an agreement are 
enumerated, codified and accepted. In general, but not in all cases, successful 
diplomatic negotiations will result in agreement regarding three strategic factors: 1) 
the exact specification of the agents who are bound by the agreement; 2) the exact 
terms of agreement in relation to who has obligations and the expected delivery of 
those obligations; and 3) exact enumeration of the agreement’s length or time limit. It 
is in this final negotiation phase where requirements/mechanisms regarding policy 
implementation, monitoring and arbitration of future disputes are stipulated and 
defined. Moreover, this model was selected because it has historical application in 
relation to analyzing global health diplomacy specifically and thus has a level of 
acceptance as an analytical heuristic that can contextualize negotiation processes 
(Lister and Lee, 2013). 
 
Although Zartman and Barman offer a useful model for understanding various phases 
of negotiation, they do not provide criteria to determine the quality of negotiated 
agreement and/or the factors required to deliver long-term and continued policy 
success. As suggested by Berridge (2005), ‘good’ diplomacy involves the 
development of relationships and mutual understanding that provide a context for 
meaningful continuance of negotiations toward the long-term resolution of collective 
action problems. The negotiation criteria for developing these forms of ‘mutually 
consistent’, long-term relationships include enhancing perceptions of trust, creating 
clear processes for effective communication, generating perceived win-win outcomes 
and assuring mutual agreement via consensus (Raiffa, 2007; Lister & Lee, 2013, 82). 
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In addition, it is generally accepted that these conditions are significantly undermined 
by perceptions of force, coercion, asymmetric power, unclear decision-making 
procedures, a lack of reason-giving and limited or unidirectional arbitration 
mechanisms and accountability chains (Starkey et al., 2010). For our purposes, if the 
ultimate aim of GHD is to “result in both better health security and population health 
outcomes for each of the countries involved as well as improving the relations 
between states and strengthening the commitment of a wide range of actors” 
(Kickbusch et al., 2013, 4; Drager, 2001), then the aims of GHD ultimately depend on 
the perceived quality of the health negotiations involved. As will be argued below in 
relation to the negotiation of PBF, evidence suggests that current PBF modalities 
undermine these negotiation ideals and that problems of asymmetrical power and 
influence continue to significantly affect diplomatic relations as they concern African 
actors and global health financing. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
As indicated above, Zartman and Berman (1982) distinguish three phases of 
negotiation between interested parties active in reaching agreement: a diagnostic 
phase, a formula phase and a negotiation phase. The case evidence suggests mixed 
perceptions about the quality of PBF negotiations across the three phases, which 
provide illuminating insights on African diplomacy in terms of negotiated PBF 
programmes and how the quality of these outcomes are often asymmetrically skewed 
by power and influence. 
 
A. Diagnostic Phase 
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All negotiating parties interviewed (Tanzania, Zambia, South Africa, World Bank and 
GFATM) broadly agreed on the general state of global health and the combined 
factors that are motivating the need for increased GHD and global health financing: 1) 
the disease burden in Africa represents a priority for global health and for global 
health financing in particular; 2) external financing is required and should be 
promoted through increased finance partnerships; 3) external funders prefer PBF as 
the mechanism for delivering global health financing, and; 4) global health targets 
such as the MDGs inevitably play an important role in PBF target setting between 
external funders and recipients.  
 
Although the results above raise intriguing questions about the scale and depth of 
norm diffusion between negotiating parties, for the purposes of this article, it is the 
apparent acceptance of PBF as a preferred modality of health financing that reveals 
interesting diagnostic openings and closures for African diplomats within negotiation 
processes. In particular, in all cases examined, there is clear diagnostic favoritism for 
PBF modalities by funders at national and global levels, and a view of its 
effectiveness as a funding mechanism for health systems, despite inadequate evidence 
to support this view (Emmert et al., 2012; Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Eldridge and Palmer, 
2009; Ireland et al., 2011; Magrath and Nicther, 2012; Montagu and Yamey, 2011; 
Scheffler, 2010; Witter et al., 2012). Within the interviews, it was possible to locate 
four rationales seen as underwriting (rightly or wrongly) the current push for PBF in 
global health (Barnes, et. at. 2015). First, PBF was suggested as a mechanism to better 
monitor health interventions, thus providing more reliable information for increased 
evidence-based policy. Second, there was belief that PBF either limited corruption or 
was a mechanism designed by external funders to help curb corruption through 
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stronger accountability mechanisms. Third, that PBF was a mechanism to increase 
value for money and limit waste. Fourth, members of the GFATM stressed their belief 
that PBF is about being accountable to those most in need by only funding projects 
that “impacted on peoples well-being in measurable and meaningful ways” (GEN1, 
Sept. 2013). 
 
However, these views were not always collectively shared by country representatives 
in Geneva or by respondents within the case countries themselves, who often 
suggested that accountability was hierarchical at GFATM with priority given to the 
demands of the funders (GEN2, Sept. 2013; TNZ1, Nov. 2012; ZAM1, Jun. 2013; 
TNZ2, Oct. 2012; SA2, Sept. 2013; SA1, Sept. 2013). In relation to the World Bank, 
one national health mission to the UN argued that PBF is an external funder-led 
initiative to ‘conditionalise’ funding and that “it might not be in the best interests of 
African states” because these conditions are “something all applications must 
conform to regardless of whether it is right for that particular applicant” (GEN2, Sept. 
2013; Barnes et al., in press).  
 
In this regard, the rationale for PBF in global health policy was not always clear and 
questions remain as to why it has become the ‘only game in town’ for health 
diplomacy. In particular, respondents from the WHO stressed that there was a general 
lack of debate about PBF and that it was often assumed or accepted that it was the 
most effective mechanism (GEN6, Sept. 2013). This belief in the effectiveness of 
PBF was widely held despite an inability by many respondents to cite concrete 
evidence. At best, respondents were able to point to a small number of particular 
cases where PBF had been seen to be effective, such as in Rwanda and Burundi, but 
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the direct evidence for such claims was often admitted to be based more on “everyday 
conversations and not from any report or evidence” (GEN3, Sept. 2013). 
 
In terms of how the preferred status of PBF affects the diagnostic quality of 
negotiated agreement, the evidence suggests that the way PBF is structuralized  by the 
World Bank and GFATM closes off other potentially more suitable modalities for 
delivering funding. In other words, the intellectual space available to conceive of 
alternative models for finance negotiation is restricted within the diagnostic phase due 
to the dominance of PBF and the pressure to accept it as the only topic for health 
negotiations. As one WHO representative stated, “I don’t think there is a great deal of 
argument taking place about the risks of these types of funding mechanisms… on the 
whole donors and consultants are in favor of target-driven financing and they have 
successfully entrenched this as the primary mode of operation” (GEN4, Sept. 2013). 
Another senior African representative to the WHO further indicated that, “there is not 
much scope for discussing funding modalities … I mean it does come up, but more in 
terms of the system needing targeted aid, and more of it. We largely discuss policy in 
terms of priorities, strategy and practice, not on the details of aid delivery” (GEN5, 
Sept. 2013). A number of interviewees expressed a level of frustration that PBF was 
not being ‘properly’ and ‘fully debated’ at the WHO or with funding institutions 
themselves because of its ‘unquestioned status’ (GEN2, Sept. 2013; GEN4, Sept. 
2013; GEN6, Sept. 2013). What this suggests, is that within global health diplomacy, 
the diagnostic phase of the PBF negotiation process is essentially fixed, with 
negotiations mainly taking place about how to get funding or to implement PBF in 
Africa, and not about the overall appropriateness of PBF as a health reform tool itself.    
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B. Formula Phase  
The case evidence suggests that there is broad accord between negotiating parties 
(funders, national/principal recipients) about the normative principles that should 
ideally underwrite PBF procedures and that these principles should act as 
foundational aims for negotiated agreement. For example: 1) there is unified 
recognition that PBF agreements should reflect the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness (PDAE, 2005), which stresses national ownership, alignment, 
harmonization, managing for results and mutual accountability; 2) there is unanimous 
stakeholder commitment to both the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA, 2008) as well as 
MDG Goal Eight, stressing that health diplomacy should represent the building of 
‘partnerships for development’; 3) there was stated stakeholder agreement that mutual 
accountability was required and that the quality of health partnership should in some 
way represent an equitable distribution of obligatory benefits and burdens across all 
parties. As a result, in relation to the ideal aims of negotiation, there is meta-
theoretical understanding between stakeholders regarding what PBF negotiations 
should aim to capture as well as recognition of the MDGs as goals from which the 
success of health diplomacy should be ultimately judged. This meta-theoretical 
understanding resonates with the previously outlined criteria deemed necessary for 
fostering ‘mutually consistent’ negotiations (Raffia, 2007; Starkey et al., 2010) and 
the basic diplomatic negotiating conditions required to satisfy the long-term aims of 
GHD (Berridge, 2005). However, despite a basic meta-theoretical understanding 
regarding what the procedures and outcomes of PBF should normatively resemble, as 
will be illustrated below, the current practice of PBF negotiations exhibit inherent 
asymmetric tensions in its perceived quality, which suggests a sizeable distance 
between theory and practice.  
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C. Negotiation Phase(s)  
The research findings revealed three general sublevels for negotiation within the 
bilateral negotiation phase of the PBF diplomacy process. These sublevels related to: 
1) negotiations to set performance-based targets; 2) the final terms of negotiated 
agreement and contract; and 3) ongoing negotiations associated with the monitoring, 
evaluation and arbitration of performance satisfaction. 
 
Negotiating targets 
When asked about the sense of partnership and national ownership with the GFATM 
and World Bank, several interview respondents revealed that although most targets 
were ‘owned’ and negotiated, the actions of both funders steered negotiations in 
particular ways (albeit by different means as discussed below). The GFATM, for 
example, was regarded as forcing ‘conditional compliances’ that are not nationally 
owned. Thus, although most interviewees across all cases felt that national 
governments can set health targets, there was widespread agreement that there was 
almost no ability to set ‘conditional targets’ such as accounting mechanisms, 
evaluation tools or reporting schemes. In addition, nearly all recipients suggested that 
the GFATM is inflexible in this regard, and there is constant external demand to 
change existing governance systems to meet exact GFATM procedures. As a negative 
example in South Africa, the Global Fund required certain procedures for archiving 
records, yet this went against national privacy protection laws. When asked about 
what this means in terms of equitable GHD, one top health official suggested, “this 
makes us question how mutual the partnership is, since the GFATM would not budge 
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on this condition despite the fact that it would violate domestic law” (SA2, Feb. 
2013). 
 
Some of those interviewed across all case studies suggested that in developing a 
contract and setting targets and indicators within PBF schemes, the World Bank had 
effectively steered many of the types of targets within their PBF programmes through 
dialogue. As one Tanzanian official claimed, “The World Bank had a number of key 
interventions that they wanted to see implemented and they were very firm in their 
demands” (GEN5, Sept. 2013; TNZ3, Nov. 2014). In the Zambian case, many 
interviewees believed that the World Bank pushed Zambia to run a pilot programme 
because they required more test trials to support their PBF evidence agenda (GEN3, 
Sept. 2014; ZAM2, Nov. 2014; Barnes et al., 2014). In setting final targets, most 
interviewees related that the Zambian government was able to push its own agenda, 
but that “the World Bank certainly had its own ideas”, and that these had to be 
incorporated into the final PBF agreement and were, to some extent, non-negotiable, 
since the conditions were attached to the possibility of receiving much needed 
funding (GEN3, Sept. 2013). As a result, interviewees revealed a high level of 
frustration at cumbersome or dogmatic conditionalities set by the World Bank and 
GFATM. According to one country representative in Geneva, “this is not partnership 
and although PBF is good, it can’t be rolled out exactly the same way everywhere and 
better distinctions of capacity and localized strengths and weaknesses need to be 
made”  (GEN2, Sept. 2013).  
 
Although there was evidence of recipients having the ability to pursue and secure 
particular interests during PBF contractual negotiations, the scope for negotiated 
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‘push back’ was different in the case of South Africa. In both South Africa and 
Geneva, interviewees suggested what appears to be a greater ability for South Africa 
to resist the demands of external funders during initial negotiations about PBF 
agreements, targets and indicators. The reasoning for this ability to push back was 
reportedly linked to South Africa having a stronger economy and less reliance on 
external funds (SA1, Feb. 2013; GEN2, Sept. 2013). From this it was implied that the 
percentage of total health budget reliance on external funders (South Africa 2.1%, 
Tanzania 40.2% and Zambia 27.8%) influences the scope of effective push back and 
the ability to resist asymmetrical conditions during PBF negotiations. Nevertheless, 
South African recipients generally felt that external funders involved in the GFATM 
process did attempt to steer deliberations toward certain target areas or target 
outcomes in line with particular donor interests. Several interviewees suggested that 
the GFATM would make strong hints in relation to the type of outputs that would be 
“more likely to be approved by the Technical Review Panel” and to firmly suggest 
what sorts of target deliveries would be deemed successful. In its most cynical form, 
one national health representative went so far as to suggest “that PBF is not a 
partnership or representative of ‘national ownership’” (GEN2, Sept. 2013; SA2, Feb. 
2013). As this interviewee suggested, PBF targets and mechanisms might be fairly 
negotiated in some cases, but that in southern Africa, and indeed elsewhere, funders 
often dictated the parameters for possible agreement in advance, closed off areas as 
non-negotiable, and “expect[ed] the applicant to do as they are told” (GEN2, Sept. 
2013). Although at this point only speculative, our evidence does raise questions 
about the relationship between budgetary reliance and negotiated PBF outcome and to 
what degree less reliance on external funding increases the possibility for more 
mutually consistent outcomes. 
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Codifying agreement  
One particular finding that cut across all case studies was that the World Bank and 
GFATM often changed or amended targets at the last minute or during the 
implementation phase. These alterations could take the form of line items being struck 
from a grant document just before implementation or could take the form of requests 
to add certain provisions to official documentation as the PBF projects were scaling 
up. For example, in South Africa, a member of UNAIDS who has worked with many 
recipients in Africa argued that GFATM often “changed the goal posts and as a result 
lost the trust of many partners” (SA3, Feb. 2013). In addition, several private sector 
actors suggested “the private sector dislikes uncertainty, especially when investment 
is involved” and that the GFATM continued last minute alterations were threatening 
future public/private partnerships (SA4, Feb. 2013). In Tanzania, officials suggested 
that having to accept last minute changes was part and parcel of the funding 
relationship, claiming that “we are the ones that want the money, they always have 
the upper hand… okay they bring that one there, you read through it, it has all the 
conditions… we end up saying okay” (TNZ1, Nov. 2012). Another Tanzanian 
described this relationship as “nobody wants to shout at the paymaster” (TNZ2, Oct. 
2012), which was mirrored in Zambia, where one ministry official suggested that you 
do what the funders want “because they are the ones who hold the purse strings” 
(ZAM1, June 2013). 
 
The stated problem with such alterations was that they were seen as unidirectional, 
where the external funders could make requests as conditions changed, but that 
recipients were not able to amend project targets easily as new information or as 
 19 
conditions on the ground changed. As a result, many interviewees questioned the 
quality and scope for negotiated arbitration in relation to building trust and clear 
communication processes, claiming, “although we are participating in discussions, the 
effectiveness of those discussions is often not equally distributed” (SA2, Feb. 2013). 
 
Monitoring, evaluating and arbitrating negotiated agreement 
The research revealed a further concern with the monitoring, evaluation and 
arbitration of PBF, especially as it related to the ability of African actors to negotiate 
a mutually consistent outcome in the face of changing circumstances. As Spector and 
Zartman note (2003), effective agreement requires the ability to monitor and arbitrate 
the conditions of an agreement and to ratify agreements in light of new evidence. 
Furthermore, the criteria for understanding the quality of negotiation and increased 
GHD outcomes requires trust building through effective communication channels, 
multidirectional decision-making processes, reason-giving, perceptions of win-win 
outcomes and mutual agreement (Raiffa, 2007; Starkey et al., 2010; Berridge, 2005; 
Lister & Lee, 2013). Yet, PBF processes were far from straightforward in this regard 
and revealed a clear asymmetry and hierarchy in negotiating position, particularly in 
Tanzania and Zambia. First, external funders often requested African actors to alter 
reporting systems, sometimes without sufficient warning or detailed explanation. For 
example, the Payment for Performance (P4P) project in Tanzania was accompanied 
last minute by a further demand by the World Bank for additional indicators to be 
incorporated into their Health Management Information System to meet Bank 
standards (Barnes et al., in press). Second, it was commonly related that funder 
reporting schemes could be changed mid-project with little consideration of the ramp-
up time needed. According to different high-level officials in South Africa, “the 
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GFATM continues to change the conditional regulations, but not always with 
sufficient warning” (SA2, Feb. 2013). This ability to change reporting systems 
without additional negotiation or consultation was not only seen by many African 
actors as undermining effective programme implementation, but also as an unfair 
ability to dictate non-negotiable terms.  
 
Like monitoring above, the evaluation of performance is a key aspect of PBF 
agreements and, in theory, there should be entry points for different actors to 
negotiate outcomes. In practice, however, evaluation was also seen as a point for 
closing down negotiations, given that any sign of non-performance could result in 
grant/loan termination. Furthermore, given that PBF tends to involve the changing of 
goalposts after contracts/project agreements have been signed, actors often found it 
difficult to understand what constitutes adequate performance and, therefore, any 
delay by extending negotiations was deemed as a disproportionate risk to recipients. 
For example, this sense of uncertainty and risk associated with PBF was reported 
throughout the Zambian case and at all levels; with health workers suggesting 
uncertainty about what performance meant and what avenues existed for additional 
discussions when discrepancies occurred within the evaluation process (Barnes et al., 
.in press)  Lastly, nearly all interviewees held the belief that there was “zero 
flexibility when it comes to meeting targets” and that additional room for negotiation 
regarding performance evaluation was often closed off by both the World Bank and 
GFATM (SA6, Feb. 2013). A further lack of GFATM flexibility in the face of 
external circumstances beyond the control of recipients was also illustrated. As one 
UNAIDS official remarked, “There is no flexibility in regards to external 
circumstances. This is particularly problematic in cases of extreme currency 
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fluctuations where funds can be reduced by 20% within a quick period of time leaving 
principal recipients underfunded, yet responsible to deliver the same targets agreed to 
prior to the economy tanking” (SA3, Feb. 2013). 
 
Lastly, another common theme across the three case studies related to a general 
understanding that current GFATM auditing systems did not allow for additional 
negotiations and that the structure was unidirectional and thus antithetical to notions 
of mutually consistent settlement as defined by Raiffa (2007) and Starkey et al. 
(2010). Respondents held this view because there was often no reason-giving or 
feedback process, no ability to see accounting reports and no ability to discuss the 
reports with the auditing Local Fund Agent (LFA). As one former LFA auditor 
himself claimed, “There was absolutely no dialogue between the recipient and the 
LFA. The reporting system is not transparent on the LFA side… the LFA is reluctant 
to provide support during the report write-up phase. Each report takes about 1.5 
months to assemble and there is no partnership in this process” (SA5, Feb. 2013). 
More broadly across the three case studies, African actors often stated an uncertainty 
about how to take arbitration cases forward, the procedures involved or what legal 
jurisdiction or laws applied (Barnes et al., in press). This suggests, along with the 
aforementioned issues, that the quality of negotiations within PBF schemes remains 
wanting, particularly in relation to the more normative understandings of global 
health diplomacy as a potential mechanism to coordinate mutually consistent and 
agreed health policies that will “ultimately improve and save lives” by improving 
long-term diplomatic relations (Marten et al., 2014).  
 
Conclusion 
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African actors within national governments generally set and negotiate performance 
targets of PBF schemes, yet the quality of PBF negotiations with external funders 
remains inconsistent in practice suggesting the existence of asymmetrical power and 
influence in relation to the quality of those negotiations. This raises questions about 
the level of power and influence being exerted by external funders and how much 
negotiation leverage African political actors have available to them within global 
health diplomacy. African negotiations are often stymied at various phases of the PBF 
negotiation process, and evidence suggests that the financial mechanisms offered by 
external funders steer and limit the quality of these negotiations themselves. This is 
largely because certain aspects of PBF are often closed off and restricted from 
negotiation, which is institutionalized at each phase of Zartman and Berman’s 
negotiated agreement model (1982). These closures come in the form of PBF 
ideational dominance that closes out finance alternatives; in the form of non-
negotiable grant/loan conditionalities that set limits to the types of health 
interventions or targets available for negotiation; and/or in the form of non-negotiable 
reporting, evaluation and arbitration mechanisms that inherently restrict further 
abilities to negotiate agreement alterations in the face of changing conditions on the 
ground. African actors could of course seek to challenge these restrictions more 
overtly, yet this would risk conflict and the subsequent closing down of access to 
health systems funding. If we are to judge the quality of African health diplomacy in 
relation to the quality of PBF negotiations within global health policy, then PBF, as it 
is currently practiced, exhibits asymmetrical power and influence by funders that 
greatly affect diplomatic relations and the future success of GHD. 
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